DAR AL HARB - E.U./FRANCE: AL QUEDA CAN DRAW ON TWO "ARMIES" IN EUROPE - RADICALIZED AMATUERS & SEASONED ACTIVISTS

All Europe has become target for terrorist apprentices
Report by Arnaud de La Grange

Were it not for the backdrop of gruesome designs and the gravest dangers, the latest jihadist attacks across the Channel could raise a smile. From the jet airliners launched into the face of triumphant capitalism to the pathetic car used to crash into Glasgow Airport, the threat seems to have lost its audacity. But it would be wrong to smile, because the incompetence of the terrorist apprentices of London and Glasgow is matched only by their resolve, their indifference to their own death and to the lives of others.

Pending the results of the British investigation, a connection is being made with a category of activists that has developed in Europe during the past five or six years. A spontaneous generation of "grassroots terrorists" attracted by the false splendour of sacrificial redemption, which, for some people, can forge links with the A-Qa'idah movement, but for others, not at all. When the head of MI5 - British domestic intelligence - Eliza Mannigham Buller, revealed a few days ago that her services had identified "200 groups or networks" in the country and were permanently monitoring "over 1,600 individuals," she was probably referring to this pool of activists.

Modernity versus radicalization

And this profile is not specific to the other side of the Channel. In France, the Nancy fanatic arrested by the DST [Territorial Surveillance Directorate] in May was more or less the same kind of troublemaker. The man in question, a radicalized Franco-Algerian Islamist, had offered his services to Al-Qa'idah's Maghrebi branch, via Internet forums. And this contact was successful. He said he was willing to attack a police station or the headquarters of the 13th Paratroop Dragoon Regiment... "This shows that an isolated individual often needs to forge a link with the organization, both in order to secure endorsement of his action and because of the need for technical support," according to Louis Caprioli, the DST's head of antiterrorism from 1998 through 2008, now a consultant with Geos, a security firm. In Germany, the two young Lebanese that planned to cause carnage on board trains in summer 2006 were probably "cousins" in militant action of the suspects in Leeds, London, and Nancy.

Technically, standards are deficient. "The generation that went through the Afghan camps, for instance, were more expert," Louis Caprioli added; "they would spend three months firing Kalashnikovs. If they proved proficient, they were initiated into explosives handling during an additional three months. And if they were really talented, they were then taught to handle chemical components in order to manufacture them."

As regards motivation, the situation is more worrying. "You must never dismiss people, however clumsy, who are willing to commit an attack, whether a kamikaze one or not," Caprioli said. "This inevitably implies a great deal of commitment and conditioning." With third-generation immigrant militants, we almost always find a deep identity crisis. "Exposure to modernity does not protect against radicalization; on the contrary, it encourages it," Farhad Khosrokhavar, senior research fellow at the EHESS [School of Advanced Social Science Studies] recently explained. Young activists no longer feel either like Pakistanis or Algerians, or like British or French citizens. Even if they have only a rudimentary knowledge of Islam, they find refuge in a trans-cultural and transnational "Muslim" identity.

French intelligence is worried about two phenomena - the increasingly rapid slide into violence by people who match this profile, and their spontaneous "volunteering." For a long time, people imagined Al-Qa'idah recruiters scouring the large urban public housing units to enroll militants. But this process is often reversed. Psychiatrist and sociologist Marc Sageman, formerly of the CIA, explained that "signing up to the jihad is a more upward than downward phenomenon. Young volunteers put themselves forward." EHESS research fellow Dominique Thomas confirmed that "the Londonistan second generation do not necessarily need to have been in contact with radical preachers. They want to be part of a global balance of power." As Islamologist Gilles Kepel put it, Bin Ladin is a "child of the videoclip" and all these youngsters derive from this promotion of terrorism the energy to go into action. Just as others have their own blog, they want to wage their own war.

All the signs are that Al-Qa'idah can draw on two "armies" in Europe - that of the radicalized amateurs and that of more seasoned activists, who are becoming more discreet but who have not disappeared. "There are signs that the brains behind Al-Qa'idah have not abandoned major attacks," one intelligence source explained, "but repression is forcing then to be cautious, and they have time." Meanwhile, somewhat amateurish attacks enable it to maintain the fear, which is itself a minor strategic victory.


Pertinent Links:

1) All Europe has become target for terrorist apprentices