USA: WILL WE OR WON'T WE DISARM THE MULLAHS?!?

Disarming the Mullahs
There are things we can do that would limit their options.
by Henry Sokolski

NOW THAT NORTH KOREA has called America's diplomatic bluff by testing a nuclear device, and the wrangling has begun over how best to sanction Pyongyang, the question arises of what's in store for Iran. Will we bomb? Some insiders say yes, that President Bush has already decided that if Iran fails to freeze its enrichment program, he will direct our Air Force to attack Iran's nuclear plants sometime before he leaves office.

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A decision to bomb should turn less, then, on when we think Iran will "go nuclear" (something we are sure to get wrong) or how effective our first strike might be (also a matter of uncertainty) than on what we and Iran are likely to do with the time such a strike might conceivably buy.

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First, since February, senior Iranian officials have repeatedly warned that Iran would retaliate against any U.S. strike by blocking the Strait of Hormuz. All oil shipped from the Persian Gulf on tankers exits through this channel.

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Second, we know Tehran is willing to use terrorist proxies against Israel, Iraq, the United States, and any of its friends.

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Finally, Iran has threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and to block further international nuclear inspections if it is sanctioned or otherwise prevented from exercising its "inalienable right" to make "peaceful" nuclear fuel. If Iran were to do this, a cascade of proliferation--starting with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey--could easily commence.

The United States and its friends could hedge against these threats, and should already be doing so. The first move is to reduce the vulnerability of energy exports from the Persian Gulf.

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The second step the United States and its allies should take is to make sure that if the Strait of Hormuz is blocked, the pain falls mainly on Iran.

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Finally, it would make sense to propose country-neutral restraints on nuclear proliferation. France has recommended that, if states violate their inspection obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and withdraw from the treaty, they ought to be held responsible for their transgressions.

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Washington also should join with its friends to fund and staff an IAEA wide-area surveillance unit that could be on the ready for cases like Iran (a $10-30 million a year proposition). Such inspections, if Iran were ever to agree to them, would be far from foolproof, but they would help slow down and ferret out illicit nuclear activities. Standing up such an inspection unit would also demonstrate that we were serious about demanding more nuclear transparency of Tehran, and that we had some clear equitable criteria by which we might increase or relax pressure on Iran. Certainly, if we took these prudential steps now, we would be in far better position to demand that the mullahs either comply with their nonproliferation obligations or face tough measures, starting with a regime-threatening oil quarantine. Getting ourselves to this point, far more than any bombing campaign, is what we should be aiming for.


Pertinent Links:

1) Disarming the Mullahs