AFGHANISTAN: HAS NATO LOST ITS COLLECTIVE MIND?!?

NATO backs Pakistan deal with Taliban
Bruce Loudon, South Asia correspondent

A CONTROVERSIAL peace agreement with Taliban-supporting militants in the rugged frontier region of Pakistan, where Osama bin Laden is believed to be hiding, emerged yesterday as the blueprint for a possible accord with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Following this week's visit to Islamabad by General David Richards, NATO's commander of coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan, it appeared the US and Britain had authorised Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to attempt to negotiate a peace deal with the Taliban.

Before going to Islamabad, it had been suggested General Richards was preparing for a showdown with President Musharraf over alleged Pakistani double-dealing with the Taliban and al-Qa'ida through its top spy agency, the ISI.

It had even been reported he would take with him the address in the Baluchistan capital of Quetta where Taliban leader Mullah Omar is living, and demand Pakistani forces arrest him.
But far from criticising General Musharraf, it appears the Pakistani leader's deal with Taliban-supporting tribal militants in the North Waziristan district of the North West Frontier Province could form the basis of an accord aimed at ending the insurgency and bringing the Taliban into the Government in Kabul.

From General Musharraf down, senior Pakistani officials are insisting that NATO is now supporting Islamabad's bid to reach a peace accord with the Taliban. Reports in New Delhi quoted General Richards as supporting the agreement with the Taliban in North Waziristan, saying it could set an example of how best to deal with such problems - dashing Indian hopes that NATO would not endorse Pakistan's strategy.

Reports said General Musharraf claimed that General Richards "absolutely agrees with the environment and my analysis, and he is asking for our help to do the same thing and we will proceed on the same course".

General Musharraf maintained that the North Waziristan strategy was "worth a try because there is no other way (than to reach an accommodation with the Taliban), and if we don't do anything, if we think that military will succeed, we are sadly mistaken. We will suffer".
The key elements of the North Waziristan deal have been strongly criticised by the Western media, but are now apparently accepted by Britain, the US and other governments that have contributed forces to the coalition fighting in Afghanistan.

South Asian strategists in New Delhi said it appeared that Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who has been opposing efforts to bring the Taliban into his Government, had clearly not won the battle with General Musharraf on the issue.

Many of the elements of the North Waziristan accord, signed on September 5, could form the basis for a peace deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Under the North Waziristan arrangement, the Pakistan Government has agreed to stop air and ground attacks on tribal militants linked to the Taliban, withdraw the Pakistan army from key points, release captured militants and pay compensation for property damage and deaths of innocent civilians in the region.

NATO has 31,000 international troops fighting in Afghanistan, coming from 37 countries, including Australia.

Indian reports yesterday said that the US and Britain had "clearly bought General Musharraf's 'if you can't beat them, join them' argument by sanctioning a peace strategy".

The reports are significant because they suggest that winning against the Taliban amid the tribal culture of Afghanistan would be extremely difficult, even for a force as powerful and sophisticated as NATO's.

Down the years, all foreign armies that have sought to assert themselves in Afghanistan have left defeated. Strategists are apprehensive that NATO's effort could go the same way.

Now a little about the "Waziristan Peace Deal", after reading the following you will get a basic idea of why I asked if NATO had lost its mind. I believe I excerpted the most important details from Niazis piece, but if I may make a suggestion: READ IT ALL.

Pakistan's Peace Deal with Taliban Militants
By Tarique Niazi

On September 5, Pakistan signed a peace deal with "Taliban militants" in North Waziristan, where its military has been battling insurgents since 2004. Under the deal, military troops have now been redeployed to their designated camps and forts within the region. The political agent, who represents the federal government in the region, signed the deal on behalf of Islamabad, while seven "militants," who represented the local "Taliban Shura" (Taliban advisory council), affixed their names to a three-page agreement that features 16 clauses binding the signatories (Dawn, September 6).

The deal offers amnesty to Taliban militants and "foreigners" (a reference to Afghan-Arabs who are members of al-Qaeda) in North Waziristan for a pledge that they would desist from mounting cross-border attacks into Afghanistan; assaulting Pakistani security forces, public servants, state property, tribal leaders and journalists; and carrying heavy weapons (Dawn, September 6). They will, however, be allowed to travel across the border into Afghanistan on a "business trip" or a "family visit" and carry "light" weapons such as AK-47s.

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Many Pakistanis of different persuasions—members of civil society, activists for democracy, liberals, leftists, nationalists and seculars—are not persuaded of the deal's intended objective, which is "peace." Rather, they see it as an instrument for converting North Waziristan into "a safe haven for al-Qaeda and the Taliban," making the Taliban Shura, a signatory to the deal, "winners" (Dawn, September 6; Daily Times, September 8). Others think the government has "ceded the [North Waziristan] region to the Taliban" and that this amounts to "a total capitulation" (Dawn, September 6; Daily Times, September 9). Unnerved by the backlash, the government hid behind the semantics, claiming that it has signed the deal with the Utmanzai tribe and not with the Taliban. Yet the Taliban Shura and its seven signatories to the deal are all members of the Utmanzai tribe, which inhabits North Waziristan. The international media, however, has insisted that the actual agreement has been "signed" indirectly between Pervez Musharraf and Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban movement (Daily Times, September 26).

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The deal is likely to embolden the Taliban to launch even more lethal attacks in Afghanistan. It is pertinent to note that the Taliban on both sides of the Durand Line, which separates Pakistan from Afghanistan, pledge their allegiance to Mullah Omar. As the Taliban do not recognize the Durand Line as an "international border," they assert their identity as Taliban, not as Afghan Taliban or Pakistani Taliban.

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"The truces between Pakistan's military and the separatists," the UN says, "have coincided with rising violence and increased attacks in four Afghan provinces along the Pakistan border." A diplomat further specifies these links by observing: "The Waziristan border is like somebody has swung the gate open. They [the Pakistanis] have brought peace there by exporting the problem."

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The growing hostility toward Islamabad in its tribal areas has further opened up hospitable space for the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The failed military operation in North and South Waziristan has troubled neighboring Khyber and Malakand Agencies as well, which have now become dangerously destabilized to the advantage of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This means more trouble for bordering Afghan provinces.

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The Taliban have since renamed the region the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan, and successfully extended their administrative and judicial reach into neighboring towns and cities, most prominently Bannu, Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, Bara and even parts of Peshawar, which is the capital city of the NWFP. The Islamic Emirate of Waziristan now has its own map and national flag, which lend it all the trappings of a state (The Post, September 28). The September 5 peace deal is the result of the Taliban's growing influence in the region.

Nevertheless, three factors hastened the deal. The first factor was the Pakistani military's inability to pacify the region, even after taking thousands of casualties, including 600 fatalities in North and South Waziristan by July; the casualty count is actually believed to be much higher than the government admits (The Economist, July 8-14).

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Second, the Taliban's parallel resurgence in Afghanistan persuaded the government to neutralize its hostility and rebuild relations with the Taliban before it was too late.

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Third, the redeployment of U.S. troops from southern Afghanistan signaled changing priorities of the international community in the region. As a result, Pakistan began to foresee the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, which it savors as an antidote to the Northern Alliance government in Kabul that it perceives as friendly to India and hostile to Pakistan. Pro-Musharraf commentators, sharing the government's assessment, predicted an impending fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban. "If the government [of Pakistan] perseveres for a few more months, a bright future will await us," one such commentator wrote (Daily Jang, September 11). Therefore, Pakistan foresees the return of a pre-9/11 Afghanistan with the Taliban in the driving seat again (Asia Times, September 9).

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While Islamabad is realigning its strategic interests with the resurgent Taliban, it certainly does not want to lose billions of dollars either, which have continued to flow in its direction since 9/11. Hence, Islamabad stands by the Taliban and fights them too.

Pertinent Links:

1) NATO backs Pakistan deal with Taliban

2) Pakistan's Peace Deal with Taliban Militants